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COMMENT
DAVIS v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
GOES TO COLLEGE:
HOLDING POST-SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS
LIABLE UNDER TITLE IX FOR PEER
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Karen E. Edmonson*
INTRODUCrION
Sexual harassment' in America's schools has been a popular
topic in recent years, not only in national newspapers and magazines,
but in federal courtrooms as well.2 The problem itself, however, is far
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2000; BA., University of
California at Los Angeles, 1995. I would like to thank all those who made the writing
of this Comment, and law school in general, bearable, namely my parents, Phyllis
Engler and Jim Edmonson, my sister Suzy, the rest of my loving family, and my circle
of friends, especially Steve Bowen. A special note of gratitude goes to Professor Tex
Dutile who inspired this Comment and to all the staff who tirelessly proofed and
critiqued my work.
1 Sexual harassment is defined as
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature... when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999).
2 See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Doe v.
Univ. of ll., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), affd on reh'g,
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from recent and has risen to clearly unacceptable levels in all
schools-elementary, secondary, and post-secondary. A 1993 study by
the American Association of University Women Educational Founda-
tion found that four out of five students reported they had been the
target of some form of sexual harassment between the eighth and
eleventh grades.3 Seventy-nine percent of these students claimed that
fellow students had been the perpetrators, an occurrence termed stu-
dent-to-student or peer harassment.4 The situation rarely improved as
students headed to universities and colleges; in 1988 a study reported
in the Journal of Vocational Behavior found that over seventy-five per-
cent of undergraduate women experience some form of harassing be-
havior during their university experience. 5 The National Association
of Women in Education claims that ninety percent of all reported in-
stances of sexual harassment on university campuses qualify as peer
harassment.6 Of course, one must wonder how many instances of har-
assment go unreported every year, creating doubt as to whether these
percentages adequately represent the true scope of the dilemma.
While peer harassment presents a serious societal problem at
large, as a legal problem American courts have been examining har-
assment in schools for over twenty years.7 Through Tite IX of the
Education Act of 1972,8 Congress made sexual discrimination illegal
in publicly-financed schools. Tite IX states that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal funding assist-
ance."9 Because the statute does not delineate the standard required
for plaintiffs to hold federally-funded educational institutions liable
for peer harassment, the task of interpretation has fallen to the dis-
trict and circuit courts around the country.
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120
S. Ct. 11 (1999).
3 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVErry WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLs 7 (1993) (summarizing research by Louis Harris and Associates).
4 See id. at 10-11.
5 See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment
in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988).
6 See Verna L. Williams, A New Harassment Ruling- Implications for College, 45
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. A56, A56 (1999).
7 The first case involving sexual harassment in an educational institution under
Title IX occurred in 1977 in Alexander v. Yale University, 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn.
1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
9 Id. § 1681 (a).
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With confusion and disparate treatment of cases among the cir-
cuits, 10 the time was ripe for the Supreme Court to decide when a
school would incur liability for peer sexual harassment among its stu-
dents. And on May 24, 1999, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion, it did."
This Comment focuses specifically on the appropriateness of ap-
plying the standard set forth in Davis at the university and college
level. It begins in Part I with a review of the progression of prior sex-
ual harassment litigation. Part II continues with an explanation of the
four theories for institutional liability supported by various circuit
courts prior to Davis. Part I explores the Supreme Court's holding
in Davis, while Part IV considers Justice Kennedy's dissent and the spe-
cific issues it raises regarding university liability. Part V provides sug-
gestions as to what schools, especially those at the post-secondary
level, should do in order to comply with Davis. Various lower court
decisions applying Davis are discussed in Part VI. The Comment con-
cludes with the argument that, because Davis proscribes such a de-
manding liability standard, it is suitable for all schools, including post-
secondary institutions.
I. CASE HISTORY OF TrrL IX SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION
In 1979, with its decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,12 the
Supreme Court changed the course of Title IX litigation forever. In
Cannon a female student brought a private cause of action under Ti-
tle IX against two private medical schools, claiming that by denying
her admission the schools discriminated against her based on her gen-
der.'3 While both the district' 4 and circuit' 5 courts dismissed her
complaint, holding that Tile IX did not allow for a private cause of
action, the Supreme Court reversed after examining the legislative in-
tent behind Title IX and Tide VI.' 6 Finding that Tide IX mirrored
Title VI,' 7 the Court explained that when Congress enacted Title IX,
10 See Part II infra for a discussion of this issue.
11 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
12 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
13 See id. at 680 & nn.1-2.
14 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aft'd, Can-
non v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
15 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 441 U.S.
677 (1979).
16 See id. at 689-709 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
17 Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
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"the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creat-
ing a private remedy."18 The Court concluded that "[n]ot only the
words and history of Title IX, but also the subject matter and underly-
ing purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of pri-
vate victims of discrimination."19 The Supreme Court had opened the
door to private litigants in Title IX actions.
Seven years later, the Court further interpreted the boundaries of
sexual harassment litigation. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,20 a Ti-
tle VII employment-discrimination case, the Court defined two types
of actionable sexual harassment-quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment.2 ' Quid pro quo claims, involving the offer of a specific benefit
in exchange for sexual favors, had been the traditional form of sexual
harassment litigation. Mentor, however, also recognized hostile envi-
ronment harassment. 22 These claims focus on the overall atmosphere
of the work or educational environment, disallowing "conduct [that]
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment. '23
Although all sexual harassment claims are, by their very nature,
fact-specific, hostile environment cases depend to an even greater ex-
tent on the totality of the circumstances. In Meitor, the plaintiff, a
teller at Meritor Savings Bank, had been involved in a sexual relation-
ship with her supervisor for a period of four years. 24 She claimed,
however, that the relationship developed in response to repeated de-
mands by her supervisor and on many occasions lacked full consent.25
The sexual episodes occurred on bank premises as well as at hotels
and had created an atmosphere in which Vinson feared losing her job
eral financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title IX is identical, with the
exception that Congress replaced the phrase "race, color, or national origin" of Title
VI with the word "sex" in Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
18 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696.
19 Id. at 709.
20 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21 The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" in sexual harassment liti-
gation are no longer controlling for employer-liability purposes. See Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). However, the terms and their definitions
remain essential when "there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove
discrimination in violation of Title VII" or Title IX. Id. at 2265.
22 See MeNtor, 477 U.S. at 65-67.
23 Id. at 65 (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (a) (3) (1999)).
24 See id. at 60.
25 See id.
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should she refuse. 26 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that
the plaintiff had stated a viable claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment 2 7 The Court also ruled, however, that "for [hostile envi-
ronment] sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment."' 28
Meritor contributed another important component to the history
of sexual harassment law by distinguishing voluntary from unwelcome
behavior. While the lower courts had focused (erroneously) on the
"voluntariness" of the plaintiff's participation in the sexual relation-
ship,29 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he correct inquiry is
whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual
advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in
sexual intercourse was voluntary."30 This distinction followed the lan-
guage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 1980
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,31 a document accorded great
deference by the Court 3 2
The next major case in the development of Title IX litigation,
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,33 involved a female high
school student charging her school with failing to prevent a teacher
from repeatedly sexually harassing and abusing her.m Franklin
claimed that the school not only had knowledge of the harassment
and did nothing to stop it, but also that its administrators and teachers
discouraged her from pressing charges.35 Again, as in Cannon, the
Court looked to the legislative history of Title IX to determine if a
plaintiff could obtain pecuniary damages from a school for violating
the statute.36 Under common law principles, when Congress creates a
law, it allows for all appropriate remedies unless expressly excluded.3 7
Examining the state of the law at the time of Title IX's enactment, the
Court concluded that this traditional common law presumption pre-
vailed. 38 Therefore, an award of monetary damages was appropriate
26 See id.
27 See id. at 67.
28 Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
29 See id. at 68.
30 I&
31 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1999).
32 See Meyitor, 477 U.S. at 65.
33 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
34 See id. at 63.
35 See id. at 64.
36 See id. at 71-73.
37 See id. at 66.
38 See id. at 71-72.
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on a showing of an intentional violation of Title IX. In explaining its
position, the Court stated that
unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate [s]' on the basis of
sex." We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexu-
ally harasses and abuses a student.39
The Northern District of California, in Doe v. Petaluma City School
District,40 relied heavily upon Franklin's holding when, for the first
time, a federal court recognized a claim for peer sexual harassment.
In Petaluma, a junior high student (Doe) endured repeated sexually
derogatory name calling, received numerous threats and physical as-
saults from both male and female students, and refused to enter the
restroom because of the pervasive graffiti.41 Eventually, when the har-
assment continued even after the administration transferred Doe to a
different public school, Doe's parents were forced to enroll her in a
private school.42 Doe also required ongoing medical and psychologi-
cal treatments due to the harassment. 43
The court in Petaluma classified the cause of action as one of hos-
tile environment sexual harassment, analogizing it to the teacher-stu-
dent situation in Franklin.44 It then held that the standard set forth in
Franklin was not a negligence standard ("knew or should have
known"), despite its reliance on Meritor and other employment
cases. 45 Instead, in order for a school to be held liable for student
sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that the school itself inten-
tionally discriminated on the basis of sex.46 This could be shown, the
court explained, circumstantially where teachers or administrators
had knowledge of peer sexual harassment yet failed to take sufficient
remedial action.47
39 Id. at 75 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
40 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), reh'ggranted, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
41 See id. at 1563-65.
42 See id. at 1566.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 1575.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 1574-76.
47 See id. at 1575. While Petaluma represents a major breakthrough in peer sexual
harassment litigation, Doe herself could not meet the standard set forth by the court
and ultimately failed in her claim. See id. at 1576.
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II. Cimcurl COURT TESTS PRIOR TO DA wYS
Before the Supreme Court ruled definitively in Davis on the stan-
dard by which a school could be held liable for peer sexual harass-
ment under Tide IX, various circuits had developed three separate
theories for liability: the "knew or should have known" negligence
standard;4 8 the "intentional discrimination" standard, which applies if
a school's response differs based on the complaining student's sex;49
and the "actual knowledge" or "deliberate indifference" standard.5 0
Additionally, a fourth theory, supported by the Eleventh Circuit,
stated that school districts could not be held liable for peer harass-
ment under Title X.51 Each of these theories will now be discussed in
turn.
A. "Knew or Should Have Known" Standard
The Fourth Circuit, in Brizonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University,52 became the first court to find liability at the college
or university level for peer sexual harassment. The plaintiff, Christy
Brzonkala, was a freshman at Virginia Tech when two student football
players raped her in her dorm room. 58 Seven months later, Brzonkala
filed a complaint under the university's Sexual Assault Policy.54 One
of the players, who admitted to raping the plaintiff, was suspended for
two semesters under the Abusive Conduct Policy, yet the University
later determined the suspension to be too harsh a penalty based on
previous cases under the same policy and deferred the punishment
48 See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997), affd on rehkg, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub noam.
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
49 See, e.g., Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997);
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
50 See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2020 (1999); Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir.
1998), amended by No. 95-16046, 1998 WL 216944 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999); Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated,
119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
51 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), rev'd 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
52 Bizonkaa, 132 F.3d at 949 On rehearing the court affirmed in respect to the
Violence Against Women Act issues but declined to render a decision on the hostile
environment Title IX issue until Davis had been decided by the United States
Supreme Court. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 11
(1999).
53 See Brzonka/a, 132 F.3d at 953.
54 See id.
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until after graduation. 55 Brzonkala sued in federal district court, al-
leging that Virginia Tech's lack of meaningful punishment violated
Title IX.56
The district court dismissed the plaintiff s Title IX claim for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.5 7 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, looking to Title
VII principles for guidance. 58 It concluded that a plaintiff, to be suc-
cessful in a Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim,
must meet the following five-part test:
(1) that she (or he) belongs to a protected group; (2) that she (or
he) was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the har-
assment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of his (or her) edu-
cation and create an abusive educational environment; and (5) that
some basis for institutional liability has been established. 59
In evaluating the fifth prong, the court stated that "[w] e must deter-
mine whether Brzonkala has alleged facts sufficient to support an in-
ference that Virginia Tech 'knew or should have known of the illegal
conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action."' 60
Thus, the Fourth Circuit became the first and only federal court of
appeals to accept the Title VII constructive negligence standard for
peer sexual harassment cases.
B. "Intentional Discrimination" Standard
The Fifth Circuit dealt with peer sexual harassment in Rowinsky v.
Bryan Independent School District.61 Holding that "a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual harassment
55 See id. at 955-56. Brzonkala discovered the school's decision to delay the sus-
pension by reading about it in the school's newspaper. See id. Fearing for her safety,
she soon after dropped out of Virginia Tech. See id.
56 See id. at 956.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 957.
59 Id. at 958. The 11th Circuit's three-judge panel in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education, 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (lth Cir. 1996), affd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct 1661 (1999), originally formulated this test, borrowing
standards from Title VII cases such as Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). However, the l1th Cir-
cuit en banc rejected this theory of liability and reversed, holding that liability cannot
attach to a school district for peer harassment. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
60 Id. at 960 (quoting Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261
(4th Cir. 1996)).
61 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
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claims differently based on sex,"62 the court established the narrowest
of the circuit interpretations of Title IX peer harassment liability.
The plaintiffs in Rowinsky, two sisters in the eighth grade, had
been harassed repeatedly on both the school bus and the school
grounds. 63 The harassment consisted of verbal abuse as well as physi-
cal touching of the girls' bottoms.64 Not only did the students com-
plain to the school bus driver at least eight times, but the girls' mother
informed the principal and superintendent of the harassment on nu-
merous occasions as well.65 When the harassing behavior did not
stop, even after the school suspended one of the boys for three days,
the mother sued the school district and various employees under Title
IX.66
The district court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff
had failed to state a claim because she never alleged that the school
treated sexual harassment differently on the basis of sex.67 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, framing the issue as
"whether a school district may be liable under Title IX when one stu-
dent sexually harasses another."68 In its analysis, the court focused on
the fact that Congress had enacted Title IX under the Spending
Clause 69 and found that Title IX's legislative history, scope, structure,
and agency interpretations all directed the court to preclude school
liability for the acts of third parties. 70 Specifically, the court held that
"[iimposing liability for the acts of third parties would be incompati-
ble with the purposes of a spending condition, because grant recipi-
ents have little control over the multitude of third parties who could
conceivably violate the prohibitions of Title IX."71 In order to state a
claim in the Fifth Circuit, therefore, a plaintiff must allege that the
school itself discriminated on the basis of sex by responding to boys'
and girls' complaints differently.
62 Id. at 1016.
63 See id. at 1008-09.
64 See id. at 1008.
65 See id. at 1008-09.
66 See id. at 1008-10.
67 See id. at 1010.
68 Id.
69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
70 See Roudnsky, 80 F.3d at 1012.
71 Id. at 1013.
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C. "Actual Knowledge" Standard
In Doe v. University of Illinois,72 a female high school student suf-
fered repeated verbal and physical sexual harassment by a group of
male students. One harasser went so far as to display his genitals to
Doe.73 Although Doe and her parents repeatedly reported the harass-
ment to school officials, they took little action to end the behavior.74
Moreover, certain administrators imputed fault to Doe and suggested
she change her own behavior to avoid future harassment.75
The district court dismissed Doe's claim, agreeing with the stan-
dard set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Rowinski that a plaintiff must show
disparate treatment by the school on the basis of sex in order to hold
the school liable.76 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, expressly rejected this theory. In explaining the flaws it
found in the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the Seventh Circuit wrote that
the plaintiffs did not seek to hold the school liable for actions of third
parties; rather, the liability should attach on the basis of the school's
own action or inaction in the face of known harassment.77 In other
words, the plaintiff could not sue a school directly for actions by a
third party but could hold an institution liable on the basis of its re-
sponse to the actions with the response constituting the harassment to
be litigated.
The court continued by rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's Spending
Clause analysis in its en banc Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
decision.78 The Seventh Circuit agreed that because Congress en-
acted Title IX pursuant to the Spending Clause, an implicit contract
arises between the recipients of federal funding and the govern-
ment.79 The court decided, however, that the Eleventh Circuit had
interpreted Title IX too narrowly.80 Since the United States Supreme
Court had already recognized the legitimacy of teacher-on-student
72 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
73 See id. at 655.
74 See id. Although the school suspended two of the boys for ten days and trans-
ferred another boy out of Doe's biology class, the harassment continued. See id.
When the school did nothing further to end or prevent the harassment, Doe's parents
transferred her to a private school. See id.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 661-62.
77 See id. at 662.
78 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). See
Part II.D infra for further discussion of this decision.
79 See Doe, 138 F.3d at 664-65; see also Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399.
80 See Doe, 138 F.3d at 664-65.
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sexual harassment under Title IX,8 ' regardless of the fact that the stat-
ute made no mention of this specific cause of action, not allowing
claims of peer harassment would be inconsistent with the goals of Ti-
tle IX.82
In determining the applicable theory of liability, the Doe court
rejected the traditional Title VII constructive notice standard.83 In-
stead, it determined that, before the school could be found liable,
Title IX required actual knowledge by a school official. 84 The court
argued that compelling the harassed student to report the offensive
conduct does not place too heavy a burden on the student and gives
the school a chance to resolve the issue before the courts become
involved.8 5 In explaining this standard, the court expressly rejected
the "knew or should have known" standard as set out in the Office of
Civil Rights' Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (OCR Guidance).86 To
this end, the court opined that "OCR's interpretation of Title IX is
not entitled to strict deference from this Court. '8 7 The "actual knowl-
edge" standard set forth in Doe v. University of Illinois, the theory most
widely followed by the circuit courts,88 ultimately prevailed in the
Supreme Court.
D. No Institutional Liability Under Title IX
The remaining standard, adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, re-
jected the availability of relief under Title IX against a school district
or institution for peer sexual harassment. Aurelia Davis, the mother
of fifth grader LaShonda Davis, sued the local school board for mone-
tary and injunctive relief under Title IX in Davis.8 9 LaShonda claimed
that a boy in her class, named G.F. by the court, had sexually and
81 See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
82 See Doe, 138 F.3d at 665. Title IX specifically safeguards students by forbidding
discrimination and the denial of educational benefits. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
83 See id. at 668.
84 Seeid.
85 See id.
86 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
87 Doe 138 F.3d at 667.
88 See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2020 (1999); Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir.
1998), amended by No. 95-16046, 1998 WL 216944 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999).
89 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (1994), rev'd, 74
F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), af/'d en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S.
Ct. 1661 (1999).
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physically harassed her for more than six months.90 After each occur-
rence, LaShonda reported the misbehavior to her teacher, as did her
mother.91 The teacher assured Mrs. Davis that she had notified the
principal about the complaints, yet G.F. received no punishment.92
When the harassment continued, Mrs. Davis contacted the school
board's superintendent, who also did nothing to end the abuse. 93 Not
only did G.F. remain a student in good standing, but for over three
months the teacher would not allow LaShonda to switch her assigned
seat away from the boy.94 The harassment finally terminated when
G.F. pled guilty to sexual battery.95 By that time, however, LaShonda
had suffered detrimental effects to her mental and physical health,
and she experienced suicidal thoughts and a significant drop in her
grades.96
The district court in Davis held that because "any harm to
LaShonda was not proximately caused by a federally-funded educa-
tional provider," the school could not be held liable under Title IX.97
Rejecting Doe v. Petaluma City School District's98 intentional discrimina-
tion theory, the court found no basis for a peer sexual harassment
claim under Title IX.99
On appeal, a threejudge panel reinstated Davis's claim and re-
manded the case to the district court. 0 0 Acknowledging that the peti-
tioner sought to hold school officials liable for their own actions in
not controlling the harassment, and not for the actions of third par-
ties, the panel decided that Davis had sufficiently stated a Title IX
claim.' 10 In explaining its reversal of the district court, the panel
stated,
90 See id. at 364.
91 See id. at 364-65.
92 See id. at 364.
93 See id. at 365.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See id.; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1666, 1667
(1999) (stating that LaShonda's "previously high grades allegedly dropped as she be-
came unable to concentrate on her studies... [and that] her father discovered that
she had written a suicide note").
97 Davis, 862 F. Supp. at 367.
98 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), reh'g granted, 949 F. Supp 1415 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
99 See Davis, 862 F. Supp. at 367.
100 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996), affd
en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
101 See id. at 1193, 1995.
[VOL- 75:31214
COMMENT: DAVIS v. MONROE GOES TO COLLEGE
[A]s Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually
hostile working environment created by co-workers and tolerated by
the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a
sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow stu-
dent or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to
act to eliminate the harassment. l0 2
In its en banc rehearing of Davis,10 3 however, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit rejected its earlier Title VII analysis and instead focused on the
legislative intent behind the enactment of Title IX under the Spend-
ing Clause.' 0 4 Determining that, because the receipt of federal funds
connotes a contractual relationship between the government and the
school, Congress is required "to give potential recipients unambigu-
ous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept fed-
eral funding."'0 5 Finding that these schools did not have notice of
potential liability for peer sexual harassment, 0 6 the court determined
that there could not be a cause of action brought against a school by a
student for peer sexual harassment under Title IX.'0 7 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari'0 8 to determine the appropriate standard for
peer sexual harassment liability, finally silencing the mounting confu-
sion and disagreement among the lower courts.
III. DA VIS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
In the months following the May 1999 ruling, scholars from nu-
merous disciplines published their opinions of the Court's approach
to the issue of peer sexual harassment liability under Title IX.10 9 The
scope of this Comment is not, therefore, to rehash what has already
been written, but to focus on the dissent's questions regarding the
applicability of the ruling to institutions of higher learning. Neverthe-
less, this discussion would be incomplete without an analysis of the
majority's opinion and the standard it announced.
102 Id. at 1193.
103 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
104 See id. at 1399.
105 Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
106 The court did hold, however, that there had been notice to educational institu-
tions of teacher-to-student sexual harassment liability. Therefore, a cause of action
could be brought against a school receiving federal funding under Title IX for sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher. See id. at 1401.
107 See id. at 1406.
108 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
109 See, e.g., Lisa A. Brown, New Harassment Ruling Can Work, 21 NAT'L. L.J. A23
(1999); Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, 220 NEw REPUBLIC 43 (1999); Mary
Leonard, Schools Can Be Liable if Pupils Harass: Supreme Court Rules on Suits, BOSTON
GLoBE, May 25, 1999, at Al.
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After deliberating for almost four-and-a-half months, the
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision and held that
in limited circumstances a private damages action for peer sexual har-
assment may lie against a publicly-funded school under Tide IX." 0
The standard delineating these limited circumstances can be broken
down into four requirements: (1) the funding recipient must act with
deliberate indifference, (2) to known sexual harassment, (3) that is so
"severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" (4) that it "effectively bars
the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.""'
In adopting this standard, the Court relied heavily on its 1998
ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District."2 Also a Title
IX sexual harassment case, Gebser involved a teacher-student relation-
ship qualifying as quid pro quo harassment in the eyes of the Court.
In Gebser, the Court abandoned Title VII's established agency and neg-
ligence theories for workplace harassment in favor of "actual knowl-
edge" and "deliberate indifference" criteria for the school setting." 3
To distinguish Tide VII from Title IX, the Court looked to their con-
gressional purposes; the former attempted to make the victim whole
in order to remedy past discrimination, while the latter involved pro-
tecting individuals from discrimination by federal fund recipients." 4
To that end, the Court concluded that "it would 'frustrate the pur-
poses' of Tide IX to permit a damages recovery against a school dis-
trict for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on principles
of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual no-
tice by a school district official."" 5
While Davis explicitly reaffirmed the admittedly "high standard
imposed in Gebser,"116 it clearly opined that "[p]eer harassment, in
particular, is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher-
student harassment."' 1 7 Interestingly, this standard presents a double-
edged sword for both sides of the debate. For victims of sexual harass-
ment and women's advocacy groups, the ruling presents a victory in
the sense that educational institutions can be held liable under Title
IX for peer sexual harassment. Marcia Greenberger, co-president of
the National Women's Law Center, hailed the ruling as "a very impor-
110 See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1666.
111 Id.
112 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
113 See id. at 283-84, 292-93.
114 See id. at 286-87.
115 Id. at 285 (quoting Guardian Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595
(1983) (White, J.)).
116 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
117 Id. at 1676.
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tant win for women and girls in schools.""l 8 Since the ruling sets such
a demanding standard for liability, however, it is questionable how
many plaintiffs will be able to meet it. This rigorous standard allows
school boards around the country to breathe a little easier. Julie Un-
derwood, general counsel for the National School Board Association,
believes that the standard "is one we can live with.'u19 Obviously,
although school boards and officials would have preferred the Court
to affirm the Eleventh Circuit's "no liability" standard, they echo the
National School Board Association's sentiment that the Court set an
acceptable standard.
Another notable topic of debate involves the comparison of the
new Title IX standard to traditional Title VII standards regarding sex-
ual harassment in the workplace. By requiring deliberate indiffer-
ence, the law burdens student plaintiffs with a much higher standard
than their adult worker counterparts in sexual harassment cases. 20
For attorney Jeffrey Thaler, the Supreme Court's holding mandates
that "students are separate, less equal, and more vulnerable legally
(and therefore factually) to sexual harassment under Title IX than are
adult workers under Title VI. " ' 2 Because the Court explicitly re-
jected the agency and negligence standards of Title VII, Thaler and
others see the Court protecting adults in circumstances under which
students are not protected.
Alternatively, the issue can be analyzed by examining the litiga-
tion risks for schools versus employers. Jennifer Braceras, a national
advisory board member of the Independent Women's Forum, points
out that
[u]nlike Title VII, which prohibits sex discrimination in employ-
ment, Title IX does not provide for agency investigation and concili-
ation of complaints prior to the filing of a case in federal court,
steps that allow cases to be resolved quickly and at low cost. And
Title IX, also unlike Title VII, provides for no statutory cap on dam-
ages. That means one large jury verdict could bankrupt a small
school district.' 22
118 See Leonard, supra note 109.
119 Id.
120 Tide VII sexual harassment cases are contingent on the theory of respondeat
superior, negating the need for the plaintiff to prove discrimination or even actual
knowledge by the employer. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257, 2265 (1998) ("In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to inter-
pret Title VII based on agency principles.").
121 Jeffrey A. Thaler, Are Schools Protecting Childrenfom Harassment?, 35 TRIAL 32, 32
(1999).
122 Jennifer C. Braceras, New Menace in the Schools: Hand Holding, WALL ST.J., May
25, 1999, at A26.
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While the argument that students may not be as protected by the
courts as employees still stands, the same holds true for schools as
compared to employers. This may relate to the courts' historical incli-
nation to avoid as often as possible matters involving internal school
policies. 123 Regardless of the reasoning behind Title VII and Title IX
application, however, courts appear to protect both employees and
employers to a greater extent than either students or educational
institutions.
While supporters of both sides of the argument in Davis did not
get everything they hoped for from the Court, generally most appear
to be pleased with the ruling. At least four people, however, were
not-the dissenting justices.
IV. THE DA us DISSENT
In a sixteen-page dissent,124 Justice Kennedyjoined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, accused the major-
ity of overlooking or misconstruing a number of fundamental points
in their ruling.' 25 While many of these concerned general principles,
a few directly addressed the question of the ruling's applicability to
post-secondary institutions. It is to these concerns that this Comment
now turns.
A. Control over Student Actions
The first issue raised by Justice Kennedy regarding the ruling's
effect at the post-secondary level involves the ability of a college or
university to control a student's actions. 126 Public schools have histori-
cally been considered substitute guardians by the courts, responsible
not only for educating children, but also for ensuring the safety and
123 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that "public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities"
and that federal courts should be hesitant to "intervene in the resolution of conflicts
which arise in the daily operation of school systems").
124 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1677-92 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125 See, e.g., id. at 1678 ("[T]he majority finds statutory clarity where there is none
and discovers indicia of congressional notice to the States in the most unusual of
places."); id. at 1680 ("To state the majority's test is to understand that it is little more
than an exercise in arbitrary line-drawing."); id. at 1682 ("Perhaps even more startling
than its broad assumptions about school control over primary and secondary school
students is the majority's failure to grapple in any meaningful way with the distinction
between elementary and secondary schools, on the one hand, and universities on the
other.").
126 See id. at 1682-83.
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well-being of their students during school hours. This idea of elemen-
tary and secondary schools being in loco parentis is still enforced by
courts; both the majority and dissenting opinions refer to the 1995
case Vernonia School District 47] v. Acton,127 in which the Court stated
that "the nature of [the state's] power [over public school children] is
custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults." 28 As the Davis dissent
correctly points out, however, universities do not exercise custodial
and tutelary control over their students.129 University students, as
emancipated adults, do not require the type of monitoring or care
necessary at the lower level schools. In fact, not only do university
students not require this custodial attention from school officials, they
often fight any type of invasive control by the institution. Social and
academic freedom are considered crucial to the learning process at
the post-secondary level, factors in opposition to overreaching institu-
tional control or monitoring. Additionally, not only do the students
and faculty resist institutional control over their actions, the university
often lacks the resources, ability, and even desire to control its student
population in all situations.
A close reading shows, however, that the majority opinion does
not state that all schools must have complete control over every stu-
dent's actions throughout the day. Common sense tells us that this is
impossible-even schools with the fewest code violations by their stu-
dents experience occasional lapses of control. True to this reality, the
Court never states that schools must abolish sexual harassment from
campuses or always prevent it.L' ° To the contrary, the standard en-
dorsed by the majority demands that institutions take appropriate or
reasonable remedial actions in the face of known harassment. 18 The
Court adamantly explains that compliance with this standard does not
require that institutions "purg[e] their schools of actionable peer har-
assment or that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary
action" in order to avoid liability.'3 2
Addressing specifically the issue of peer harassment in higher ed-
ucation, the majority writes,
[T] he standard set out here is sufficiently flexible to account both
for the level of disciplinary authority available to the school and for
the potential liability arising from certain forms of disciplinary ac-
127 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
128 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655).
129 See id. at 1683.
130 See id. at 1673-74.
131 See id. at 1674.
132 Id. at 1673-74.
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tion. A university might not, for example, be expected to exercise
the same degree of control over its students that a grade school
would enjoy ... and it would be entirely reasonable for a school to
refrain from a form of disciplinary action that would expose it to
constitutional or statutory claims.
13 3
This statement implies that the ability of a school, whether elemen-
tary, secondary, or post-secondary, to control its students factors into
the determination of whether the school's response was reasonable.
The court must determine reasonableness in light of the totality of the
circumstances, an approach that will allow colleges and universities
some leeway in their decisions concerning discipline or alternate rem-
edies when dealing with sexual harassment on their campuses.
An interesting issue regarding control over university students
arises when one distinguishes between public and private institutions.
Historically, private colleges have been expected to, and in most cases
do, exert more control over students and their actions both on and off
campus than have their public counterparts. The Davis decision,
therefore, may subject private institutions that receive government
funding under Title IX to a greater risk of liability because they main-
tain a greater level of control over student behavior. Since the major-
ity finds that a university's ability to control its students factors into the
determination of whether the university's response was reasonable,
13 4
must private universities act faster and take more precautions than
their public counterparts are expected to? Possibly. Yet the fact that
the degree of control remains merely one of many factors when deter-
mining the reasonableness of a school's response appears to diminish
the impact of this particular factor on liability.
B. First Amendment Rights
The second issue raised by the dissent in regard to post-secondary
application of the majority's standard relates to the students' First
Amendment right of free speech.1 35 The dissenting justices opine
that, when schools discipline for speech violating sexual harassment
policies, they may be punishing students for constitutionally protected
speech.1 3 6 The dissent cites a multitude of federal cases in which the
courts struck down university speech codes and anti-harassment poli-
133 Id. at 1674.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 1683.
136 See id.
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cies.137 Concluding this argument, Justice Kennedy writes, "The diffi-
culties associated with speech codes simply underscore the limited
nature of a university's control over student behavior that may be
viewed as sexual harassment."138
While the issue of First Amendment rights has been a major topic
in federal courts,139 the dissent appears to overlook important issues
that distinguish traditional First Amendment cases from freedom of
speech in harassment cases. First, unless the person or entity enforc-
ing a speech code or regulation is a state actor, no constitutional issue
exists. The law recognizes public colleges and universities as state ac-
tors and attributes any official action by the institution as state-en-
dorsed. Therefore, the Constitution, with all of its protections,
applies to public campuses with the same force and vigor as it does in
any public area. Private colleges, conversely, form a contractual rela-
tionship with their students. 40 As mere parties to a contract, not state
actors, private institutions can validly enforce speech codes that would
otherwise infringe on a student's First Amendment rights.
While this would lead one to believe that only public universities
are subject to the mandates of the Constitution, certain states have
enacted state codes that prohibit private schools from encroaching on
a student's First Amendment rights, regardless of the absence of state
action. California, for example, enacted the Leonard Law,141 which
states,
No private postsecondary educational institution shall make or en-
force any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely
on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that,
when engaged in outside the campus or facility of a private post-
secondary institution, is protected from governmental restriction by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution .... 142
137 See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); IOTA
XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1993); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
138 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1683.
139 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Southworth, 119 S. CL 1332 (1999); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley College, 883
F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
140 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) ("The relationship the par-
ents had sought to enter into with the [private] schools was in the court's view unde-
niably contractual in nature."); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
157 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that it is a "well-settled rule that the relations between a
student and a private university are a matter of contract").
141 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (Deering 1996).
142 Id. § 94367(a).
2000] 1221
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Therefore, before dismissing a First Amendment claim against a pri-
vate school, it is imperative to determine if the institution is located in
a state with such a code, since the First Amendment appears to enjoy
the same force at all post-secondary campuses in such states.
Next, the First Amendment does not protect all forms of speech.
Specific categories such as fighting words, perjury, defamatory lan-
guage, and obscenity are not constitutionally protected and are there-
fore punishable by a court of law. Furthermore, the Constitution
protects conduct even less than it protects speech. In Texas v. John-
son,143 the Court set forth a two-part test enabling certain conduct to
fall into the category of protected communication under the First
Amendment. First, the actor must intend to "convey a particularized
message," and second, there must be a great likelihood that those who
view the conduct would understand the message being conveyed.14 If
these two criteria are met, the conduct is deemed expressive commu-
nication under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause and is likely
protected. If not, then the actor has no constitutional right to engage
in the conduct and may be legally prohibited from such actions by a
school or other institution.
Additionally, in KtA. V v. St. Pau41 45 the Supreme Court held,
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for exam-
ple, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets), a
particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
directed at conduct rather than speech.146
An examination of most harassment codes reveals that the bulk focus
on student conduct, not speech. Moreover, in order for harassment
to rise to the level indicated by the Court as actionable, some type of
offensive conduct is, for all practical purposes, mandatory, as pure
speech will rarely rise to the high standard set by Davis.
Even if the Constitution presumptively protects the affected
speech or conduct, a school may have a state interest so compelling
that regulation of the communication is legal. Because sexual harass-
ment codes constitute content-based regulations rather than content-
neutral ones,147 the university must apply this compelling-state-inter-
143 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
144 Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
145 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
146 Id. at 389.
147 Content-based regulations, such as codes prohibiting racial or ethnic slurs,
seek to prohibit communication based on the message being conveyed. Content-neu-
tral regulations, conversely, restrict speech based on the time, place, and manner of
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est test in order justify the regulations. This test requires the institu-
tion to prove that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."148 As
the dissent dramatically points out with its laundry list of unsuccessful
speech codes cases, however, the courts have been largely unwilling to
find this test satisfied by universities attempting content-based regula-
tions.149 With this case history, it is difficult to understand the Davis
Court's support for harassment policies and discipline procedures,
policies that must be content-based. 150
Because this Comment examines the Davis ruling at the post-sec-
ondary level in particular, it must necessarily examine the issue of free
speech from a more general perspective, looking at case law that deals
with communication both on and off university campuses. A brief
mention should be made, however, of the Supreme Court's rulings
dealing with speech at elementary and secondary schools. In these
cases, the Court gives school officials a significantly broader power to
regulate speech in educational settings while still honoring the First
Amendment. Three decisions stand out as forming the dominant
doctrinal approaches: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,'51
the communication. For example, codes that prohibit speech or conduct that dis-
rupts the teaching environment are content-neutral and have generally been upheld
by courts as constitutional so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances.
Content-neutral codes can also regulate speech and conduct on a public university
campus outside of the classroom as long as they are narrowly-tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest and alternate means of communication are available to the
students. For an excellent review of speech issues surrounding university speech
codes, see James R. Bussian, Anatomy of the Campus Speech Code: An Examination of Pre-
vailing Regulations, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 153 (1995).
148 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
149 See supra note 137.
150 Is it possible that the Court is carving out yet another exception to protected
speech, given the need to remedy the detrimental secondary effects of sexual
harassment?
151 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker, a pivotal case in First Amendment rights for
school children, established the "substantial disruption test" still in use today. The
Tinker children, two boys and a girl ranging in age from 13 to 16, participated in a
silent protest against the Vietnam war by wearing black armbands during the holiday
season. See id. at 504. When the principals of the Des Moines schools became aware
of this plan, they enacted a policy that any student wearing and refusing to remove a
black armband at school would be suspended until he or she agreed not to wear the
band on school grounds. See id. All three of the Tinker children were suspended for
wearing the armbands to school and did not return to classes until after New Year's
Day, the last day of the silent protest. See id. Their parents brought a complaint in
district court seeking an injunction prohibiting the school from punishing them. See
id. The court agreed with the petitioners that the wearing of black armbands ex-
pressed a political viewpoint and therefore constituted protected speech, but it held
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Bethel School District v. Fraser,15 2 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.'5 3 If the particular speech significantly affects the safety or
security of other students, or if it causes a substantial or material dis-
ruption to the educational process, Tinker allows the speech to be pro-
hibited.15 4 In Fraser, the Court determined that school officials could
in favor of the school since the armbands could have reasonably created a disturbance
to the operation and discipline of the school. See id. at 508. The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed without opinion, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding the silent, passive
action to be protected speech. See id. at 506. Attempting to balance a student's free
speech right versus the school's need to maintain a disciplined, orderly environment,
the Court determined that only student actions that materially disrupt class, create a
substantial disorder to the educational environment, or invade the rights of other
students are unprotected by the Constitution. See id. at 513.
152 478 U.S. 675 (1986). This case involved a high school student, Matthew Fraser,
delivering a student government nominating speech at a mandatory school assembly.
See id. at 677. Approximately 600 students heard the speech, which contained an
"elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" describing the candidate. Id. Fra-
ser's teachers had warned him prior to the assembly that the speech was inappropri-
ate and should not be given, but he decided to give it unmodified regardless of their
advice. See id. The following day, school officials informed Fraser that his speech
violated the school rule forbiding obscene language, which stated, "Conduct that ma-
terially and substantially interfere [s] with the educational process is prohibited, in-
cluding the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id. After the school gave
Fraser a chance to explain his conduct, he was suspended for three days and disquali-
fied from the list of candidates for graduation speaker. See id. Fraser's father brought
suit in district court alleging that the rule violated his son's First Amendment rights.
See id. The court agreed that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 677-80. The Supreme Court re-
versed, upholding the school's right to regulate obscene and lewd speech in the
educational setting. See id.
153 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, three students brought suit against their
school district in response to school officials having deleted two pages from their
school newspaper, the Spectrum. See id. at 262. The Journalism II class wrote and
edited the paper, which was distributed approximately every three weeks to students,
school personnel, and members of the community. See id. For the May 13, 1983 edi-
tion, the students had written articles regarding high school pregnancies at Hazel-
wood and the impact of divorce among the student population. Id. at 263. The
principal reviewed these articles, and after conferring with the supervising teacher
and other superior officials, he required that the pages containing these articles be
deleted from the Spectrum before publication. See id. The district court concluded
that "school officials may impose restraints on students' speech activities that are 'an
integral part of the school's educational function.'.. . so long as their decision has 'a
substantial and reasonable basis."' Id. at 264 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp.
1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the paper was
a public forum and therefore the school's censoring of its content offended the First
Amendment. See id. at 265. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the paper,
as a class project, was not a public forum. See id. at 273-74.
154 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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prohibit vulgar or plainly offensive speech, even if it does not disrupt
or substantially interfere with the educational atmosphere.15 5 And fi-
nally, the Court decided in Hazelwood that, if the speech is school-
sponsored, the school has a right to regulate it, providing the regula-
tion is reasonably related to valid educational or pedagogical
concerns.
156
These cases show that the Supreme Court permits public school
officials to regulate student speech in many situations, and at first
glance this trend would seem to favor post-secondary regulations as
well. If one looks to the reasoning behind these rulings, however, it
becomes apparent that the Court did not intend for these exceptions
to the First Amendment to apply to all schools, especially not at the
post-secondary level. A variety of factors arise in public elementary
and secondary schools that do not apply in a university setting. Minor
school children constitute a captive audience, restrained in their seats
by compulsory attendance laws. As discussed above, kindergarten to
twelfth grade schools act in loco parentis, creating a legal duty of care
toward the child. Additionally, these children have a state-given legal
right to a free education at least through elementary school-and
sometimes through high school as well. Finally, "elementary and sec-
ondary school students, unlike their counterparts at the college and
university level, are more impressionable and vulnerable, and thus
they are less capable of handling uninhibited, robust discussion on all
subjects. 15 7 With all of these issues to take into account, the Supreme
Court has a legitimate interest in protecting public elementary and
secondary level school children from harassing, vulgar, or disruptive
speech. For the most part, however, these issues are not present on
the university campus, where academic freedom and the exchange of
controversial ideas supply a welcome and necessary addition to the
learning process. Therefore, to rely on the above trilogy of cases to
allow content-based speech restrictions at the post-secondary level
would be erroneous.
So where does this leave colleges and universities that want to
(and, under the Court's interpretation of Tide IX, are required to)
restrict and punish sexually harassing speech on their campuses? The
good news is that most harassing behavior, as noted above, combines
speech and conduct. Since conduct may be more easily regulated
155 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
156 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
157 Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-On-
Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in Schoo4 75 N.D. L. Rnv. 205, 233
(1999).
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than speech, schools can focus on these actions without offending the
First Amendment. Additionally, sexual harassment may violate other
laws, such as sexual assault, sexual battery, and rape, which can be
used to prosecute the harasser. And let us not forget Davis's exacting
standard requiring harassment to be drastically "severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive." 158 It is hard to imagine a situation in which pro-
tected speech would rise to this level without accompanying unpro-
tected speech or conduct.
C. Standard for "Who Must Know" About Harassment to
Impute Knowledge
A third issue that the dissent raises concerns who must have
knowledge of the harassment in order to impute actual knowledge to
the school itself.159 The dissent declares that the majority never truly
defines the standard, leaving lower courts to distinguish the type of
school employee who must have knowledge of the harassment before
it is actionable under Title IX.160 This important question affects ele-
mentary and secondary schools as well as post-secondary institutions.
A careful reading of the majority's opinion reveals that, while it
does not explicitly set forth a list ofjob titles that would automatically
impute knowledge to the school, the holding does determine the stan-
dard by which lower courts must adjudicate future disputes. Primar-
ily, the Court relies on the Tide IX teacher-student harassment case
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Districtl6' to shape its entire ap-
proach, especially Gebser's "actual knowledge" and "deliberate indiffer-
ence" requirements. Gebser required notice to "an official of the
recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the dis-
crimination" in order for the school to have actual knowledge of the
harassment.162
Additionally, Davis cites with approval the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing to the same effect in Doe v. University of Illinois.16 3 Doe held that a
school district faces liability if "a school official who had actual knowl-
edge of the abuse was invested by the school board with the duty to
supervise the [harasser] and the power to take action that would end
such abuse and failed to do so."164 Furthermore, the Davis majority
158 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1666.
159 See id. at 1688-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160 See id. at 1688.
161 524 U.S. 274 (1998). See also Part III supra for a brief discussion of Gebser.
162 Id. at 290.
163 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999). See also Part II.C
supra for an explanation of Doe.
164 Id. at 668 (internal quotation omitted).
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repeatedly refers to the conduct of administrators and school boards
as the source for potential liability, 65 implying that knowledge by
lower-ranked employees, such as secretaries, janitors, and possibly
even certain levels of teaching staff, would not impute knowledge to
the school itself. Therefore, the majority implicitly and explicitly re-
quires actual knowledge by a person employed by or representing the
school or district in such a capacity as to exert substantial control over
either the harasser or the situation in which the harassment
occurred.166
Inevitably, the true impact of the standard set forth in Davis will
flow from the lower courts' interpretation of the holding. The Tenth
Circuit recently faced this question in Murrell v. School District No. 1.167
Murrell involved a physically and mentally disabled female high school
student and a fellow classmate who sexually assaulted and battered
her on multiple occasions in a secluded area of the school grounds. 68
While the plaintiff's mother personally contacted the principal and
various teachers regarding the incidents, the school took no action
against the harasser. 6 9 Amazingly, the victim herself was suspended
for inappropriate and detrimental behavior after a meeting between
the principal and her mother, while the harasser continued to attend
classes and work on campus as a janitor's assistant. 70
The district court dismissed the claim, relying on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,'71 which
precluded relief without a showing of intentional discrimination by
the school itself.' 72 The Tenth Circuit, however, abated the case
pending the United States Supreme Court's review of Davis.'73 Ana-
lyzing the petitioner's claim in light of Davis, the court in Murrell re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the Title IX cause of action and
remanded the case.' 74
Unlike the Davis dissent's projection that lower courts would re-
spond to the ruling with confusion and misinterpretation, 75 the court
in Murrell tackled the issue with relative ease. While stating that Davis
165 See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1672-73.
166 See id.
167 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
168 See id. at 1243.
169 See id. at 1244.
170 See id.
171 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
172 See Murrell 186 F.3d at 1245.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 1252.
175 See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1687-90.
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"did not expressly set out the standard for determining when a school
board has sufficient notice that harassment is taking place,"176 the
Tenth Circuit went on to explain that "the [Davis] Court held that
liability properly attaches when the misconduct 'takes place while the
students are involved in school activities or otherwise under the super-
vision of school employees."'1 77 After examining Doe v. University of
Illinois,178 specifically because the Davis Court cited it with approval,
the Tenth Circuit determined that the standard required a school offi-
cial who possessed substantial control of the situation.17 9 Addition-
ally, the court opined that
[b]ecause officials' roles vary among school districts, deciding who
exercises substantial control for the purposes of Title IX liability is
necessarily a fact-based inquiry. Davis makes clear, however, that a
school official who has the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps
by measures such as transferring the harassing student to a different
class, suspending him, curtailing his privileges, or providing addi-
tional supervision, would meet this definition.' 80
Applying this standard, the court found that the principal met
this description and, therefore, the school district did have actual
knowledge of the situation and would be held liable if proven to have
reacted unreasonably.'18 The court also remarked that the teachers
who were aware of the harassment would most likely meet the stan-
dard as well, but it declined to rule definitively on this point since
knowledge had already been imputed to the school through the
principal.'8 2
D. Off Campus Versus On-Campus Conduct
One issue not raised specifically by the Davis dissent still seems to
evoke concerns at the university level: the ability and duty of a school
to attempt to regulate and discipline students for off-campus conduct.
In regard to this issue, Davis states that "because the harassment must
occur 'under' 'the operations of' a funding recipient [according to
the mandates of Title IX,] . . .the harassment must take place in a
176 MurreU, 186 F.3d at 1247.
177 Id. (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672-73
(1999)).
178 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
179 See Murrell 186 F.3d at 1247.
180 Id.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1248.
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context subject to the school district's control.'u8 3 While classroom
behavior and other activities occurring on school grounds during
school hours would most certainly qualify, there remains the question
of conduct taking place off-campus. Most likely, harassment transpir-
ing on a school bus or while on a class field trip would be considered
within the control of the school. If the harassment occurred between
two students at an off-campus apartment or a movie theater, however,
would the courts require the school to take some action against the
harasser? This question is a bit more troublesome.
As a practical matter, the issue returns us to the question of the
amount of control the school has previously attempted to exert over
its students. Has the school informed students that its regulatory poli-
cies apply off-campus as well as on? Do any of the policies distinguish
between on and off-campus conduct? Are administrators trained to
deal with both on and off-campus situations? Who was involved in the
incident and what was their relationship to the school? A court may
ponder some of these questions when addressing this issue. It is safe
to say, however, that the more removed the activity is from the school,
the less control (and therefore liability) the school can expect and can
be expected to have.
For example, consider the following situations, ranked (arguably)
in order of most to least control by a university: (1) a pizza party at a
local pizza parlor hosted by the university's band; (2) a school-spon-
sored fraternity's weekly "kegger"; (3) a group of students celebrating
the latest football victory at the neighborhood bar; (4) two students'
first date of dinner and a movie. It seems reasonable that the school
should expect to assume some degree of responsibility for the actions
of school-sponsored groups, even while off-campus. The question be-
comes more challenging, however, when the situation involves individ-
ual students interacting off-campus for purely personal motives. Only
further interpretation by the lower courts will clarify this problem.
V. WHAT SHOULD SCHOOLS Do TO COMPLY wrrH DA rs?
The Court in Davis cited OCR's Guidance very favorably.184 The
Guidance makes many suggestions on how schools can become Title
IX compliant in regard to sexual harassment, whether peer, teacher-
student, or third party. First, OCR states that
[s]chools are required by Title IX to adopt and publish a policy
against sex discrimination and grievance procedures providing for
183 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1999) (quoting 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1687 (1994)).
184 See, e.g., id. at 1675 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997)).
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prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of discrimination on
the basis of sex. Accordingly, regardless of whether harassment oc-
curred, a school violates this requirement of Title IX if it does not
have those procedures and policy in place.18 5
Additionally, OCR explains that since 1975 Title IX has required that
schools enact discrimination policies.' 8 6 Therefore, all schools should
certify that they have a current discrimination policy and re-examine
any existing policies to determine if they meet the Davis standard. In
order to be compliant, the policy and procedures should be easily un-
derstandable by all readers, not written in "legalese," and readily avail-
able to all students, faculty, and staff. As OCR notes,
A grievance procedure applicable to sexual harassment complaints
cannot be prompt or equitable unless students know it exists, how it
works, and how to file a complaint. Thus, the procedures should be
written in language appropriate to the age of the school's students,
easily understood, and widely disseminated.' 8 7
The policy should clearly explain what types of conduct it prohib-
its, the precise steps for filing a complaint, and what procedures will
follow a filed complaint. All investigations and hearings must be
prompt, thorough, and fair to all parties. If the school determines
that harassment has actually occurred, it must take appropriate disci-
plinary actions matching the severity of the conduct. Additionally,
each school "shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its
efforts to comply with and carry out its [Title IX] responsibilities."1 8 8
The school also is responsible for providing students, faculty, and staff
with the name of the coordinator, his responsibilities as they relate to
sexual harassment, and how to contact him if the need arises.18 9
VI. POST-PA VS CASES
The true test of a new ruling depends on interpretation and ap-
plication of the modem standard by lower courts. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's recent holding in Murrell v. School District No. 1190 further
explains the practical meaning of the "knowledge" standard. Addi-
tional cases shed light on other aspects of the Davis standard. At the
185 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,044 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
186 See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,051 (1997).
187 62 Fed. Reg. 12,045 (1997).
188 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1999).
189 See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,045 (1997).
190 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Part V.C supra for additional discus-
sion of this decision.
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university level, in Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology,' 9' the
court deliberated over the Davis requirement that the harassment be
"severe, pervasive and objectively offensive." 9 2 In Adusumilli, a female
student alleged that four male professors and six male students had
sexually harassed her. 93 Because Adusumilli had reported only two
of the incidents, both involving students, to school officials, the court
applied the Davis "actual knowledge" standard tojustify only consider-
ing those two incidents in its decision.' 94 While the court acknowl-
edged that under Davis single incidents of student misconduct could
theoretically constitute actionable sexual harassment, it ultimately de-
cided that neither incident "involved 'pervasive' and 'offensive' har-
assment of the type that would be actionable under Tite IX."'9 5 The
court of appeals therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
case.196
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Soper v. Hoben'97 provides an inter-
esting analysis of the "deliberate indifference" standard. In Soper the
plaintiff, a junior high student with Down's syndrome, alleged that a
classmate had raped and sexually abused her in their classroom dur-
ing a lunch break, and that two other boys sexually harassed and
abused her on both the school grounds and the school bus.198 The
Sixth Circuit found that, while the rape most certainly was "severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive," the plaintiff did not prove that
the school acted with deliberate indifference after it had knowledge of
the misconduct.199 The court explained,
Once [school officials] did learn of the incidents, they quickly and
effectively corrected the situation. Defendants immediately con-
tacted the proper authorities, investigated the incidents themselves,
installed windows in the doors of the special education classroom,
placed an aide in [the plaintiff's] classroom, and created student
counseling sessions concerning how to function socially with the op-
posite sex.200
Moreover, once a criminal investigation determined that the rape had
actually occurred, the school immediately expelled the boy responsi-
191 No. 98-3561, 1999 WL 528169 (7th Cir. July 21, 1999).
192 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1666.
193 See Adusumilli, 1999 WL 528169, at *1.
194 See id.
195 Id.
196 See id. at *2.
197 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
198 See id. at 848-49.
199 See id. at 855.
200 Id.
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ble.2 0 1 The court concluded that the school board did not show delib-
erate indifference to the plaintiff since it acted reasonably to correct
the situation as soon as officials had notice of the incidents.20 2
CONCLUSION
It is still too premature to determine whether the Davis dissent's
fear of a watershed of litigation will come to pass.2 0 3 Additionally,
only further litigation will determine how the issues of control, free
speech, and actual knowledge by school officials will affect cases in-
volving post-secondary institutions. We can only trust that the lower
courts will apply the Davis standard in an effective and meaningful
manner, allowing only those cases displaying true signs of actionable
harassment to be heard.
The standard set forth in Davis does not pose a significant prob-
lem for post-secondary universities and colleges. While the holding
will require many institutions to update their harassment codes and
consider student complaints more seriously, this is a long-overdue
change. Because courts can take into account the age of the student,
the type of educational institution involved, the school's ability to con-
trol its students, and the countervailing concerns of free speech, it
remains a difficult challenge to prove a university is liable under Title
IX, even after Davis. Most important, courts examine all hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims under a totality-of-the-circum-
stances test, a test that allows schools to prove that they responded
reasonably, all things considered. In sum, by setting a bright-line stan-
dard for all schools, the Court effectively ended much of the confu-
sion and disagreement regarding sexual harassment in education. It
was about time.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1689 (1999) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority's limitations on peer sexual harassment suits can-
not hope to contain the flood of liability the Court today begins. The elements of the
Title IX claim created by the majority will be easy not only to allege but also to
prove.").
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